The $63 Million Dam That Never Held Water

The Promise

In 2014, the Kenyan government announced an ambitious water security project: two massive dams in Elgeyo Marakwet County that would irrigate 80,000 acres of farmland, generate 60 megawatts of electricity, and provide water to 150,000 residents. The Arror and Kimwarer dams were heralded as transformative infrastructure that would bring prosperity to an arid region.

The price tag was substantial—$450 million for both dams, funded through loans from the Italian government. But for a region that had suffered decades of water scarcity, the investment seemed justified. Communities were promised irrigation systems, hydroelectric power, and economic development.

Nearly a decade later, those promises remain unfulfilled. The dams were never built. The land sits empty. And $63 million in public funds has vanished.

Following the Money

Our investigation began with a simple question: where did the money go? Through freedom of information requests and analysis of procurement records, we reconstructed the financial trail.

The bulk of these funds went to CMC di Ravenna, an Italian construction company. According to contract documents, CMC was supposed to conduct feasibility studies, environmental assessments, and preparatory work. But when we visited the proposed dam sites, we found no evidence of these activities.

Local residents reported that surveyors appeared briefly in 2015, took measurements, and never returned. No equipment was delivered. No temporary structures were built. No environmental studies were published.

The Paper Trail

Documents obtained through our investigation reveal a pattern of questionable payments:

• $23 million paid for "preliminary designs" that were never delivered to the Kenyan government
• $18 million for "equipment procurement"—no equipment arrived at the sites
• $12 million for "environmental impact assessments" that were never made public
• $10 million in "mobilization fees" for contractors who never mobilized

The contracts themselves contained unusual provisions. Standard international development projects require milestone-based payments tied to deliverables. These contracts allowed upfront payments with minimal oversight.

The Whistleblower

In 2018, a former project manager came forward with internal documents showing that senior officials knew the projects were non-viable but continued disbursing funds. The whistleblower, whom we're calling "James" to protect his identity, worked for the Kerio Valley Development Authority, the government agency overseeing the dams.

"By 2016, it was clear the dams would never be built. The geological surveys showed the terrain was unsuitable. The water flow studies indicated insufficient supply. But the payments kept flowing. When I raised concerns, I was told to stay quiet or lose my job." — "James," former project manager

James provided us with email correspondence, internal memos, and payment vouchers. The documents show that warnings about the project's viability were systematically ignored. In one memo from 2017, an engineer wrote that "proceeding without proper geological analysis risks project failure and massive financial loss."

That engineer was reassigned shortly after sending the memo.

The Shell Companies

Further investigation revealed a network of shell companies that received subcontracts from CMC. These companies, registered in Kenya with minimal disclosed ownership, performed no visible work but received millions in payments.

We traced three such companies through corporate registry records:

All three companies share a registered address—a small office building in Nairobi that houses dozens of other companies. When we visited, the building manager had never heard of these companies. The companies had no employees, no equipment, and no online presence beyond basic registration documents.

The Political Connection

The investigation took a significant turn when we examined political donations and shareholding structures. Several individuals connected to the shell companies had made substantial political contributions to campaigns of senior officials involved in approving the dam projects.

We're not alleging direct quid pro quo, but the pattern raises questions about conflicts of interest and due diligence in contractor selection.

What Should Have Happened

International best practices for infrastructure projects of this scale require:

1. Comprehensive feasibility studies before contract signing
2. Independent technical reviews by third-party experts
3. Milestone-based payments tied to verifiable deliverables
4. Public disclosure of contracts and payment schedules
5. Regular audits by oversight bodies

None of these safeguards were properly implemented for the Arror and Kimwarer projects. The result: $63 million lost, and communities still without water.

The Response

We reached out to all parties involved for comment. Here's what we heard:

In 2019, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission opened an investigation into the dam projects. Three years later, no charges have been filed, and no funds have been recovered.

The Human Cost

Beyond the financial loss, there's a human cost that's harder to quantify. Elgeyo Marakwet County remains water-scarce. Farmers still rely on rain-fed agriculture. Communities lack reliable drinking water.

Mary Chebet, a farmer in the region, told us: "They came with promises. They said we would have water for our crops, electricity for our homes. We waited. Nothing came. Now we know the money is gone, and we are still waiting."